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Abstract
We consider the provision of an abstract service to single-dimensional agents. Our model in-
cludes position auctions, single-minded combinatorial auctions, and constrained matching mar-
kets. When the agents’ values are drawn from a distribution, the Bayesian optimal mechanism
is given by Myerson (1981) as a virtual-surplus optimizer. We develop a framework for prior-free
mechanism design and analysis. A good mechanism in our framework approximates the optimal
mechanism for the distribution if there is a distribution; moreover, when there is no distribution
this mechanism still performs well.
We define and characterize optimal envy-free outcomes in symmetric single-dimensional en-
vironments. Our characterization mirrors Myerson’s theory. Furthermore, unlike in mechanism
design where there is no point-wise optimal mechanism, there is always a point-wise optimal
envy-free outcome.
Envy-free outcomes and incentive-compatible mechanisms are similar in structure and per-
formance. We therefore use the optimal envy-free revenue as a benchmark for measuring the
performance of a prior-free mechanism. A good mechanism is one that approximates the envy-
free benchmark on any profile of agent values. We show that good mechanisms exist, and in
particular, a natural generalization of the random sampling auction of Goldberg et al. (2001) is
a constant approximation.
1 Introduction
The theories of optimal mechanism design for revenue maximization and social surplus maximiza-
tion are fundamentally different. The revenue-optimal mechanism (Myerson, 1981) depends on
the prior distribution from which the values of the agents are drawn whereas the surplus-optimal
mechanism is prior-free (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973). In fact, the latter result is
singular in this regard. Incentive constraints bind across possible misreports of each agent; there-
fore, an optimal mechanism must generally trade off performance on one input (i.e., profile of agent
valuations) for another.
The goal of prior-free mechanism design and this work therein is to sacrifice optimality to obtain
prior freedom. Of course, the hope is that not too much in the way of performance is lost. One way
to make such a hope precise is to require that the prior-free mechanism perform within a constant
factor of the Bayesian optimal mechanism when there is a distribution.
With this goal in mind, Hartline and Roughgarden (2008) give prior-free single-item auctions to
maximize the agents’ utility (surplus less payments). For any profile of valuations their mechanism
approximates the performance of the best, in hindsight, (i.i.d.) Bayesian optimal mechanism.
Approximation of this prior-free benchmark implies simultaneous approximation of the Bayesian
optimal auction when the values of the agents are drawn from an i.i.d. distribution. Our main goal is
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to extend this framework and approach to richer environments that include position auction (e.g.,
Varian, 2007; Edelman et al., 2007), single-minded combinatorial auctions (e.g., Lehmann et al.,
2002), and constrained matching markets (e.g., Bikhchandani et al., 2008).
A first challenge with our goal is that the benchmark of Hartline and Roughgarden (2008)
is analytically complex in general environments. Therefore, we consider an alternative approach
motivated by the similarity between incentive and no-envy constraints. An outcome is envy free
if no agent prefers the treatment of another to her own. I.e., no agent wishes to unilaterally
swap outcomes with another. Incentive compatibility, on the other hand, requires that no agent
wants to misreport her value. Importantly envy freedom, as a constraint, binds point wise on a
valuation profile whereas incentive compatibility binds across different valuation profiles (for the
possible misreports of the agents). While incentive-compatible mechanisms do not generally have
point-wise optima, envy-free outcomes do.
A centerpiece of our work is a characterization of envy-free outcomes and their optima. This
characterization is structurally equivalent to Myerson’s (1981) characterization of Bayesian optimal
mechanisms applied to the empirical distribution given by the actual profile of agent values. The
envy-free optimal outcome is a virtual-surplus maximizer. This connection between envy freedom
and incentive compatibility is implicit in Jackson and Kremer (2007) where it is shown that they
are equivalent in the limit, in contrast we show that they are structurally equivalent generally.
As a benchmark for prior-free mechanism design, the optimal envy-free performance is appealing
as it inherits many nice properties of Bayesian optimal mechanisms. It is the maximum of a
linear objective subject to feasibility constraints. Furthermore, in environments such as constrained
matching markets, the envy-free optimal revenue point-wise dominates the revenue of the Bayesian-
optimal incentive-compatible mechanism for any i.i.d. distribution. We view the envy-free optimal
revenue as an unattainable prior-free “first-best” solution and, because of constraints of incentive
compatibility, attempt to show that “second-best” approximation mechanisms are not to far away
from it. While the Jackson and Kremer (2007) result implies such a result holds in the limit, we
show that it continues to hold in general.
The incentive-compatible mechanisms that we design will satisfy the following prior-free perfor-
mance guarantee: Their revenue on any profile of valuations will be within a constant multiplicative
factor of the optimal envy-free revenue for the same valuation profile. The approximation factors
we obtain range from 6.24 to roughly 2500. While these bounds are outside the realm of being
practically significant in themselves, they do have important theoretical and practical implications.
A mechanism that is a constant approximation in theory must exhibit at least some of the necessary
characteristics needed for good performance in practice. As an example of the contrapositive, we
show that mechanisms based on reserve prices do not give constant approximations in the environ-
ments that we consider. Furthermore, since our goal is theoretical understanding of good properties
of mechanisms in environments where the optimal mechanism is complex, properties and analysis of
constant approximations are provide more abstract understanding. Finally, the closer a mechanism
is to optimal the more potential there is for the form of the mechanism to be overly dependent
on modeling details that may not be accurate of practice. Hence, simple mechanisms that give
constant approximations are often robust and detail free in the sense of Wilson (1987). Finally,
in practice these mechanisms perform much better than their theoretical guarantees. For deeper
motivation of approximation in mechanism design see the survey of Hartline (2011).
Our first approach for the design of prior-free mechanisms for general environments is via
reduction. A digital-good environment (a.k.a., unlimited supply) is one where the mechanism has
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no inter-agent feasibility constraint. A multi-unit environment (a.k.a., limited supply) is one where
the mechanism has a constraint on the number of agents that can be simultaneously served, e.g.,
multiple units of a single item. We given a reduction from multi-unit environments to digital-
good environments that loses at most a factor of two in approximation factor. We then give a
lossless reduction from position auction environments and constrained matching environments to
multi-unit environments. To obtain these reductions we give a structural characterization of these
environments that shows that they are equivalent, even with respect to approximation. Given
the 3.12-approximation for digital goods given by Ichiba and Iwama (2010), our reduction implies
6.24-approximations for multi-unit, constrained-matching, and position environments.
Our second approach is via a generalization of the random sampling auction of Goldberg et al.
(2001) and Baliga and Vohra (2003). The auction takes the following form: The agents are ran-
domly partitioned into a market and a sample. The sample is then used for market analysis and
its empirical distribution is calculated. The optimal auction for the empirical distribution of the
sample is then run on the market. This prior-free mechanism is one of the most fundamental, and
we extend the analysis techniques derived for it in digital-good environments to multi-unit and
(more generally) downward-closed environments. A downward-closed environment is given by a set
system that specifies which agents can be simultaneously served. The only constraint placed on
this set systems is that subsets of feasible sets are themselves feasible. The approximation factors
we obtain are 12.5 and 189 for multi-unit (and by the reduction above, constrained-matching and
position auction environments) and downward-closed environments respectively.
Related Work. Our work fundamentally relies on the theory of optimal auctions as defined
by Myerson (1981) and refined by Bulow and Roberts (1989). In particular, Myerson shows that
Bayesian optimal mechanisms are virtual surplus optimizers and Bulow and Roberts show that
the virtual value of an agent in this virtual surplus maximization can be viewed as the marginal
revenue as given by an agent’s value distribution.
The random sampling auction for digital goods was first studied by Goldberg et al. (2001).
The asymptotic performance of the mechanism was given by Segal (2003) and Baliga and Vohra
(2003) and the convergence rate was studied by Balcan et al. (2008). In contrast, Goldberg et al.
(2006a) consider the non-asymptotic behavior of the random sampling auction and show that its
performance is a (large) constant factor from a prior-free benchmark that in retrospect coincides
with ours. Alaei et al. (2009) give a nearly tight analysis that shows that the random sampling
auction is a 4.68-approximation (the lower-bound is four).
There have been numerous attempts to design good prior-free mechanisms for digital goods
outside the random sampling paradigm. Two notable approaches include an approximate reduc-
tion to the “decision problem”1 by Goldberg et al. (2006a) and an approach based on statisti-
cal estimates that are non-manipulable with high probability by Goldberg and Hartline (2003).
Hartline and McGrew (2005) extend the former approach and obtain an approximation factor of
3.25. Finally, Ichiba and Iwama (2010) show that a convex combination of these approaches gives
an approximation factor of 3.12. The 6.24-approximation we obtain is the instantiation of our
reduction with the 3.12 approximation of Ichiba and Iwama (2010).
The digital good auctions described above were analyzed in comparison to a natural single-
priced benchmark. Hartline and Roughgarden (2008) suggest that approximation of a prior-free
1Given a target profit, the decision problem is to construct a mechanism that obtains that target profit when it
is attainable.
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benchmark should imply approximation of the Bayesian optimal mechanism for any i.i.d. distribu-
tion. Benchmarks for which such an implication holds are well grounded in the classical theory of
Bayesian optimal auctions. They propose the performance of the best, in hindsight, Bayesian opti-
mal mechanism as a benchmark. For multi-unit environments, they characterize this benchmark as
two-priced lotteries. In contrast, our benchmark, the envy-free optimal revenue, can be viewed as
a relaxation of the Hartline-Roughgarden benchmark that is structurally simpler and analytically
tractable in general downward-closed environments.
Subsequent to our study, Ha and Hartline (2012) generalized the statistical-estimation-based
approach of Goldberg and Hartline (2003) to design a 32-approximation of the envy-free bench-
mark in downward-closed environments. A generalization of the reduction-to-the-decision-problem
approach of Goldberg et al. (2006a) yields a 19-approximation (Ha and Hartline, 2011).
Overview. In Section 2 we describe in detail the our abstract environment for mechanism design
which includes multi-unit, position, and combintorial auctions. In Section 3 we characterize envy-
free outcomes and their optima. In Section 4 we compare incentive-compatible and envy-free
revenues. In Section 5 we describe our prior-free design and analysis framework and give Bayesian
justification for using the envy-free optimal revenue as a prior-free performance benchmark. In
Section 6 we describe a reduction-based approach wherein we show that, e.g., constrained matching
mechanisms reduce to position auctions which reduce to multi-unit auctions which reduce (with
a loss of a factor of two) to digital-good auctions. In Section 7 we describe a random sampling
auction and analyze this auction in downward-closed environments.
2 Single-dimensional Environments
There are n ≥ 2 agents. Each agent i has a valuation vi for receiving an abstract service. The
valuation profile is v = (v1, . . . , vn). We assume that the agents are indexed in order of decreasing
values, i.e., vi ≥ vi+1. An agent i who is served with probability xi and charged price pi obtains
utility ui = vixi − pi. Individual rationality requires that ui be non-negative.
We are allowed to serve certain feasible sets of agents as given by a set system. The set system
is downward-closed in the sense if a set of agents is feasible, so is any of its subsets. The empty
set is always feasible. We allow randomization in two senses (1) the set system constraint may be
randomized (i.e., by convex combination over set systems) and (2) the set of agents served may be
random (by convex combination over feasible sets). Notably, randomization in (1) is given by the
environment and randomization in (2) is by our choice of outcome. We define an allocation as a
vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [0, 1]
n where xi is the probability that agent i is served. An allocation
is feasible if it is the characteristic vector induced by the process above. The environments per-
mitted include digital good auctions, multi-unit auctions, position auction environments, matroid
environments, and single-minded combinatorial auctions.
We further assume that the feasibility constraint imposed by the environment is symmetric,
i.e., the set of feasible allocations is closed under permutation. Digital good, multi-unit auction,
and position auction environments are all symmetric. Given any asymmetric environment its corre-
sponding permutation environment is obtained by randomly permuting the agents with respect to
the feasibility constraint. Of special interest for us will be downward-closed permutation environ-
ments and matroid permutation environments. By definition these environments are symmetric.
To make the model described above precise, we give the following formal definitions.
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Definition 2.1 (single-dimensional environment). There are n agents denoted N = {1, . . . , n}.
The sets of agents that can be simultaneously served are denoted by X ⊂ 2N . The mechanism may
serve S ⊂ N if S ∈ X .
Definition 2.2 (downward-closed environment). A downward-closed environment is a single-
dimensional environment were all subsets of feasible sets are feasible. I.e., S ∈ X and T ⊂ S
implies that T ∈ X .
Single-minded combinatorial auctions are an example of a downward-closed environment. In a
single-minded combinatorial auction each agent i desires a specific bundle (i.e., subset) of a set of k
available items. Agent i has value vi for receiving her entire desired bundle (or a superset of it) and
value zero otherwise. We say an agent is “served” if she receives her desired bundle. Notice that a
set of agents S can be simultaneously served (i.e., S ∈ X ) if their desired bundles are disjoint. Of
course, if S has disjoint desired bundles and T ⊂ S, then T has disjoint desired bundles, hence X
is downward closed.
Definition 2.3 (matroid environment). A matroid environment is a downward-closed environment
that satisfies an additional augmentation property: there is always an element in a larger cardinality
feasible set that can by feasibly added to a smaller feasible set. I.e., given two feasible sets S, T ⊂ X
with |S| < |T |, there exists an i ∈ T \ S such that S ∪ {i} ∈ X .
Two key consequences of the augmentation property are that (1) all maximal feasible sets have
the same cardinality and that (2) the greedy algorithm optimizes surplus, i.e., the sum of the values
of the agents served (see e.g., Oxley, 1992). The greedy algorithm sorts the agents by their values
and then, in this order, greedily serves each agent if it is feasible to do so given the subset of agents
previously served. Importantly the greedy algorithm is ordinal in that only the order of values
matters in determining the surplus maximizing set and not the magnitude of the values. Matroid
environments have a rich history in mechanism design, see e.g., Talwar (2003), Bikhchandani et al.
(2008), and Hartline and Roughgarden (2009).
The example of a matroid environment that is most relevant to auction theory is that of con-
strained matching markets. In a constrained matching market each agent i desires one of a subset
of k available items and her value for any item in this subset is vi (her value for any other item
is zero). The agent demand sets induce a bipartite graph between agents and items where an
edge is between agent i and item j if j is one of i’s desired items. A subset S of agents can be
simultaneously served if there is a matching in the bipartite graph were all of S is matched. This
matroid is known as the transversal matroid.
A special case of the transversal matroid is when the market is essentially partitioned into ℓ
parts and within each part every item is acceptable to every agent (of course, there may be fewer
items than agents in the part). This is known as the partition matroid. A special case if the
partition matroid is the one where there is only one part, i.e., there are k identical items, and n
agents who each desire one of these items. This matroid is known as the k-uniform matroid and it
corresponds precisely to the standard k-unit auction environment.
Definition 2.4 (multi-unit environment). There are n unit-demand agents and k units of an item.
I.e., X = {S : |S| ≤ k}.
An important special case of the multi-unit environment is one where the supply constraint k
is never binding, i.e., when k = n. This special case is known as the digital-good environment.
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Definition 2.5 (digital-good environment). There are n unit-demand agents denoted N = {1, . . . , n}
and any subset of them can be served. I.e., X = 2N .
A generalization of multi-unit environments that has recently been under intense scrutiny due
to its application to auctions for selling advertisements on Internet search auction is the position
environment (Varian, 2007; Edelman et al., 2007).
Definition 2.6 (position environment). There are n agents and n positions. The positions have
non-increasing weights w = (w1, . . . , wn). If an agent i is assigned position j she served with
probability wj and her value for this assignment is viwj .
It has been observed, e.g., by Dughmi et al. (2009), that there is a close connection between
position environments and convex combinations of multi-unit environments. E.g., if we choose the
supply k randomly so that k-units are available with probability wk − wk+1 then this distribution
over k-unit environments gives the same service probabilities as the position auction. Of course,
a k-unit auction is a position auction wherein the k highest weights are one, and the remaining
weights are zero.
Digital-good, multi-unit, and position environments are agent-symmetric whereas matroid and
downward-closed environments may not be. We can compose any environment with a permutation
that renames the agents with respect to the set system. The convex combination of these environ-
ments with the permutation taken uniformly at random from the set of n-element permutations is
referred to as a permutation environment and it is symmetric.
Definition 2.7. Given any n agent single-dimensional environment specified by X , the permutation
environment for X draws permutation π (mapping i to j by π(i) = j) uniformly at random from the
set of all n-element permutations, and the feasible sets are given by Xpi = {{π(i) : i ∈ S} : S ∈ X}.
3 Optimal Envy-free Pricing
In this section we derive a theory of optimal envy-free outcomes in single-dimensional environ-
ments that mirrors that of Bayesian optimal (incentive compatible) mechanisms for i.i.d. prior
distributions (cf., Myerson, 1981; Bulow and Roberts, 1989).
Definition 3.1 (Envy freedom). An allocation x with payments p is envy free for valuation profile
v if no agent prefers the outcome of another agent to her own. Formally,
∀i, j, vixi − pi ≥ vixj − pj.
We first characterize envy-free outcomes in terms of the allocation. For a given allocation x
there may be several pricings p for which the allocation is envy free. Since our objective is profit
maximization we will characterize the p corresponding to x that gives the highest total revenue.
The proof of this characterization as it is nearly identical to that of the analogous (and standard)
characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms; we include it for completeness.
Definition 3.2. An allocation is swap monotone if the allocation probabilities have the same order
as the valuations of the agents, i.e., xi ≥ xi+1 for all i. (Recall agents are ordered with vi ≥ vi+1.)
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Figure 1: The solid curve depicts a swap monotone allocation as a function of the values (points).
The shaded area corresponds to agent i’s payment pi from Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.1. In symmetric environments, an allocation x admits a non-negative and individual
rational payment p such that (x,p) is envy free if and only if x is swap monotone. If x is swap
monotone, then the maximum payments for which (x,p) is envy free satisfy, for all i, (Figure 1)
pi =
∑n
j=i
(vj − vj+1) · (xi − xj+1)
=
∑n
j=i
vj · (xj − xj+1).
Proof. Monotonicity and the payment identity imply envy-freedom: Suppose x is swap monotone.
Let p be given as in the lemma. We verify that (x,p) is envy-free. There are two cases: if i ≤ j,
we have:
pi − pj =
j−1∑
k=i
vk · (xk − xk+1) ≤ vi ·
j−1∑
k=i
(xk − xk+1) = vi · (xi − xj),
and if i ≥ j, we have:
pi − pj = −
i−1∑
k=j
vk · (xk − xk+1) ≤ −vi ·
i−1∑
k=j
(xk − xk+1) = vi · (xi − xj).
Rearranging the results of these calculations we have the definition of envy freedom.
Envy-freedom implies monotonicity: Suppose x admits p such that (x,p) is envy-free. By
definition, vixi − pi ≥ vixj − pj and vjxj − pj ≥ vjxi − pi. By summing these two inequalities and
rearranging, (xi − xj) · (vi − vj) ≥ 0, and hence x is swap monotone.
The maximum envy-free prices satisfy the payment identity: Agent i does not envy i + 1 so
vixi − pi ≥ vixi+1 − pi+1, or rearranging: pi ≤ vi(xi − xi+1) + pi+1. Given pi+1 the maximum
pi satisfies this inequality with equality. Letting pn = vnxn (the maximum individually rational
payment) and induction gives the payment identity: pi =
∑n
j=i vj · (xj − xj+1).
Importantly, the above characterization leaves us free to speak of the (maximum) envy-free
revenue of any swap monotone allocation x on values v, which we denote by EFx(v). For any v
and any symmetric environment we will now solve for the envy-free optimal revenue, denoted by
EFO(v).
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Figure 2: R and R¯ are the revenue curve and ironed revenue curve of the valuation profile (6, 4, 4).
The ironed virtual value of the high-value agent is 6, and the ironed virtual value of the two low-
value agents are both (12− 6)/2 = 3. E.g., the optimal EF revenue in the k = 2 unit environment
is R¯(2) = 9.
We will characterize the envy-free optimal revenue in terms of properties of the valuation profile
v. Given a valuation profile v we denote the revenue curve by Rv(i) = i · vi for i = {1, . . . , n}
(recall vi’s are indexed in decreasing order). For convenience we also let R
v(0) = Rv(n + 1) = 0.
The ironed revenue curve, denoted R¯
v
(i), is the minimum concave function that upper-bounds Rv.
Likewise, define the virtual valuation function Φv(v) = Rv(i) − Rv(i − 1) and the ironed virtual
valuation function Φ¯v(v) = R¯
v
(i) − R¯
v
(i − 1), where i ∈ {1, . . . , n + 1} is such that v ∈ [vi, vi−1).
(We set v0 =∞ for notational convenience.) See Figure 2.
Rv(i) is the best envy-free revenue one can get from serving exactly i agents at the same price
deterministically. Consider a 2-unit auction example with one high-value agent with value 6 and
two low-value agents with value 4. It is envy free to serve one high-value agent and one low-value
agent at price 4, achieving revenue R(2) = 8. Interestingly, this is not optimal. The following
allocation and payments are also envy-free: serve the high-value agent with probability 1 at price
5, and serve a low-value agent chosen at random at price 4. Both units are always sold and the
total revenue is R¯(2) = 9. In what follows we will derive that this revenue is optimal among all
envy-free outcomes.
Lemma 3.2. The (maximum) envy-free revenue of a swap monotone allocation x satisfies:
EFx(v) =
∑n
i=1
Rv(i) · (xi − xi+1) =
∑n
i=1
Φv(vi) · xi.
Proof. The proof is by the following equalities:
EFx(v) =
∑n
i=1
pi =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=i
vj · (xj − xj+1)
=
∑n
i=1
ivi · (xi − xi+1) =
∑n
i=1
R(i) · (xi − xi+1)
=
∑n
i=1
(R(i)− R(i− 1)) · xi =
∑n
i=1
Φv(vi) · xi.
An implication of the characterization of the envy-free revenue of a pricing as its virtual surplus,
i.e.,
∑
iΦ(vi)xi, suggests that to maximize revenue, the allocation should maximize virtual surplus
subject to swap monotonicity (and feasibility). In symmetric environments with monotone virtual
valuation functions, the maximization of virtual surplus results in a swap monotone allocation. In
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general symmetric environments, the allocation that maximizes ironed virtual surplus is both swap
monotone and revenue optimal among all swap monotone allocations.
Lemma 3.3. In a symmetric environments, the allocation that maximizes ironed virtual surplus
with ties broken randomly is swap monotone.
Proof. Suppose Φ¯(vi) > Φ¯(vj) then xi ≥ xj; otherwise, swapping xi for xj would have higher
ironed virtual surplus. Suppose Φ¯(vi) = Φ¯(vj), then xi = xj because of random tie breaking and
the symmetry of the environment.
Theorem 3.4. In any symmetric environment with any valuation profile v, the allocation x that
maximizes ironed virtual surplus w.r.t. Φ¯v maximizes envy-free revenue among all swap-monotone
allocations. I.e., EFO(v) = EFx(v).
This theorem is proved by a useful lemma that relates revenue to ironed virtual surplus.
Lemma 3.5. For any swap-monotone allocation x on valuation profile v,
EFx(v) ≤
∑n
i=1
Φ¯v(vi) · xi =
∑n
i=1
R¯
v
(i) · (xi − xi+1),
with equality holding if and only if xi = xi+1 whenever R¯
v
(i) > Rv(i).
Proof. To show the inequality, we have:
EFx(v) =
∑n
i=1
R(i) · (xi − xi+1)
=
∑n
i=1
R¯(i) · (xi − xi+1)
−
∑n
i=1
(R¯(i)− R(i)) · (xi − xi+1)
≤
∑n
i=1
R¯(i) · (xi − xi+1),
where we use the fact that R¯(i) ≥ R(i) and xi ≥ xi+1. Clearly the equality holds if and only if
xi = xi+1 whenever R¯(i) > R(i).
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Consider x that optimizes ironed virtual surplus with random tie breaking
and also consider any other swap monotone x′. Note that whenever R¯(i) > R(i), we have Φ¯v(vi) =
Φ¯v(vi+1) for which random tie-breaking implies xi = xi+1. Therefore x satisfies Lemma 3.5 with
equality and it is optimal for the summation of the equality, whereas x′ satisfies it with inequality
and may not be optimal for the summation. Thus EFx(v) ≥ EFx
′
(v) and x is revenue optimal.
As an example of this theorem, consider the position auction environment with weights w1 ≥
w2 ≥ . . . ≥ wn. An ironed virtual surplus maximizer assigns agents with higher ironed virtual
values to slots with larger click probabilities, breaking ties randomly, ignoring agents with negative
ironed virtual values. The ironed virtual surplus, and thus revenue, is
∑
{i : Φ¯(vi)≥0}
Φ¯(vi) · wi,
which can be read off the revenue curve, e.g., Figure 2.
Importantly, ironed virtual surplus maximization for position auctions is ordinal, i.e., only the
order of the ironed virtual values matters. The optimal envy-free outcome can then rephrased as
follows: First, tentatively assign the agents to slots in order of their values. Second, randomly
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permute the order of each group of agents with equal ironed virtual surplus. In section 6 we will
discuss consequences for environments for which surplus maximization is ordinal.
In downward-closed permutation environments, after the set system is realized, we find the
allocation that maximizes ironed virtual surplus. With the appropriate payments, this outcome is
envy free given the permutation. Importantly, this optimization is not ordinal.
4 Incentive Compatibility versus Envy Freedom
The major challenge in designing and analyzing incentive compatible mechanisms is that the incen-
tive constraint binds across all possible misreports of the agents. We therefore view a mechanism as
an allocation rule and payment rule pair where x(v) and p(v) denote the allocation and payments
as a function of the agent values.
Definition 4.1 (Incentive Compatibility). A mechanism is incentive compatible if no agent prefers
the outcome when misreporting her value to the outcome when reporting the truth. Formally,
∀i, z,v, vixi(v) − pi(v) ≥ vixi(z,v−i)− pi(z,v−i),
where (z,v−i) is obtained from v with vi replaced by z.
Definition 4.2 (Value Monotonicity). An allocation rule is value monotone if the probability that
an agent is served is monotone non-decreasing in her value, i.e., xi(z,v−i) is non-decreasing in z
for all agents i.
The following well-known theorem characterizes ex post IC mechanisms.
Theorem 4.1. (Myerson, 1981) An allocation rule x(·) admits a non-negative and individually
rational payment rule p(·) such that (x,p) is incentive compatible if and only if x(·) is value
monotone, and the uniquely determined payment rule is:
pi(v) = vixi(v) −
∫ vi
0
xi(z,v−i)dz.
Because the payments are uniquely determined by the allocation rule, for any allocation rule
x(·), we let ICx(v) denote the IC revenue from running x(·) over v.
We now compare envy-free revenue to incentive-compatible revenue for ironed virtual surplus
optimizers in permutation environments, i.e., where agents are assigned to roles in the set system
via a random permutation. We show that these quantities are often within a factor of two of each
other.
First we lower bound IC revenue by half of the maximum envy-free revenue under a technical
condition. In the following we use ICΦ¯i (v) and EF
Φ¯
i (v) to denote the IC and EF revenue from agent
i by applying the ironed virtual surplus maximizer Φ¯, respectively.
Lemma 4.2. For downward-closed permutation environments, all valuations v, and Φ¯, the ironed
virtual valuation function corresponding to some v′ obtained from v by setting a subset of agents’
values to be 0, we have that ICΦ¯i (v) ≥
1
2 EF
Φ¯
i (v) for all i.
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Proof. Let x(·) denote the allocation rule of the ironed virtual surplus optimizer Φ¯. By the as-
sumption of the lemma, for all j, Φ¯(z) is constant for all z ∈ [vj+1, vj), and hence the IC allocation
rule in fact maps each z ∈ [vj+1, vj) to xi(vj+1,v−i).
By Lemma 4.1, ICΦ¯i (v) is equal to
∑n
j=i(vj − vj+1) · (xi(v) − xi(vj+1,v−i)) which, referring
to Figure 3, equals the area above the IC curve and below the horizontal dotted line. On the
other hand, EFΦ¯i (v) is equal to
∑n
j=i(vj − vj+1) · (xi(v) − xj+1(v)), which similarly corresponds
to the area above the EF curve and below the horizontal dotted line. It suffices to prove that:
xi(v)−xi(vj+1,v−i) ≥
1
2 ·(xi(v)−xj+1(v)). Note that xi(vj+1,v−i) = xj+1(vj+1,v−i) as now agents
i and j+1 have the same value, this is equivalent to xi(v)+xj+1(v) ≥ xi(vj+1,v−i)+xj+1(vj+1,v−i).
The last inequality says that the total winning probability of agent i and j+1 can only decrease
if agent i lowers her bid to vj+1. To prove this, we fix the permutation that maps agents to roles
of the set system, and show that the number of winning agents from i and j + 1 can only be lower
after agent i decreases her value. There are two cases to verify: (1) Agent i wins after the decrease.
Then before the decrease, agent i had higher value, and the optimal feasible set would be the same.
(2) Agent j + 1 wins and agent i loses after the decrease. Then before the decrease, at least one of
agents i and j + 1 would win.
Figure 3: Depiction of EF allocation and IC allocation rule from which the payments for agent i are
computed. The EF allocation curve maps each value in [vj+1, vj) to xj+1(v), and the IC allocation
curve maps each z to xi(z,v−i).
In matroid permutation environments, envy-free revenue upper-bounds incentive-compatible
revenue.
Lemma 4.3. For matroid permutation environments, all valuations v, and all ironed virtual val-
uation functions Φ¯, for all agent i, EFΦ¯i (v) ≥ IC
Φ¯
i (v).
Proof. Recall that EFΦ¯i (v) =
∑n
j=i(vj − vj+1) · (xi(v) − xj+1(v)) and IC
Φ¯
i (v) =
∫ vi
0 (xi(v) −
xi(z,v−i))dz. By the monotonicity of xi(z,v−i) in z, IC
Φ¯
i (v) is upper-bounded by
∑n
j=i(vj −
vj+1) · (xi(v)− xi(vj+1,v−i)). Recall that xi(vj+1,v−i) = xj+1(vj+1,v−i). It suffices to prove that
xj+1(v) ≤ xj+1(vj+1,v−i). To see this, ironed virtual surplus maximizers are greedy algorithms in
matroid permutation settings, and if agent i decreases her bid to vj+1, agent j + 1 is less likely to
be blocked by i who was earlier in the greedy order, and is hence more likely to be allocated.
There are downward-closed permutation environments where the envy-free optimal revenue does
not upper-bound the incentive-compatible revenue of all virtual surplus maximizers. The proof is
by example and can be found in Appendix A.2; for this example the amount that the IC revenue
exceeds the EF revenue is a small fraction of the total EF revenue.
11
Lemma 4.4. There exists a downward-closed permutation environment and valuation profile v,
such that if Φ¯ = Φ¯v is the ironed virtual valuation function of v, then ICΦ¯(v) > EFΦ¯(v).
5 Prior-free Mechanism Design and Benchmarks
As discussed previously, no incentive-compatible mechanism obtains an optimal profit point-wise on
all possible valuation profiles. Therefore, to obtain point-wise guarantees, the literature on prior-
free mechanism design looks for the incentive compatible mechanism that minimizes, over valuation
profiles, its worst-case ratio to a given performance benchmark. It is important to identify a good
benchmark for such an analysis to be meaningful.
If the designer had a prior distribution over the agent valuations then she could design the mech-
anism that maximizes revenue in expectation over this distribution. This is the approach of Bayesian
optimal mechanism design as characterized by Myerson (1981) and refined by Bulow and Roberts
(1989). Given a distribution F , virtual values and revenue curves can be derived. The optimal
mechanism is the one that maximizes ironed virtual surplus.
Theorem 5.1. (Myerson, 1981) When values are i.i.d. from distribution F the optimal mechanism,
ICOF , is the ironed virtual surplus optimizer for Φ¯ corresponding to F .
If the agent values are indeed drawn from a prior distribution, but the designer is unaware
of the distribution, then a reasonable objective might be to design a mechanism that is a good
approximation to the optimal mechanism for any unknown distribution. This prior-independent
objective is a relaxation of our prior-free objective.
One important criterion for a prior-free benchmark is that its approximation should imply prior-
independent approximation: if a mechanism is a constant approximation to the benchmark, then
for a relevant class of distributions, it should be a constant approximation to the Bayesian optimal
mechanism under any distribution from the class.
For matroid permutation environments, Lemma 4.3 implies that for any values v the optimal
envy-free revenue EFO(v) (which is at least the envy-free revenue of any ironed virtual surplus
optimizer) is at least the incentive compatible revenue of any ironed virtual surplus optimizer. By
Theorem 5.1, the Bayesian optimal mechanism is an ironed virtual surplus optimizer so EFO(v)
upper-bounds its revenue. Consequently, a prior-free β-approximation to EFO is also a prior-
independent β-approximation for all distributions.
Unfortunately, even for simple the digital good environment it is not possible to obtain a prior-
free constant approximation to EFO (see Goldberg et al., 2006b). This impossibility arises because
it is not possible to approximate the highest value v1. For essentially the same reason, it is not
possible to design a prior-independent constant approximation for all distributions. We therefore
restrict attention to the large family of distributions with tails that are not too irregular.
Definition 5.1 (Tail Regularity). A distribution F is n-tail regular if in n-agent 1-unit environ-
ments, the expected revenue of the Vickrey auction is a 2-approximation to that of the Bayesian
optimal mechanism.
The definition of tail regularity is implied by Myerson’s regularity assumption via the main
theorem of Bulow and Klemperer (1996). The intuition for the definition is the following. For
n-agent 1-unit environments, all the action happens in the tail of the distribution, i.e, values v for
which F (v) ≈ 1 − 1/n; therefore, irregularity of the rest of the distribution does not have much
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consequence on revenue. Tail regularity, then, restates the Bulow-Klemperer consequence, as a
constraint on the tail of the distribution and leaves the rest unconstrained.
We now define the benchmark for prior-free mechanism design. Approximation of this bench-
mark guarantees prior-independent approximation of all n-tail-regular distributions.
Definition 5.2. The envy-free benchmark is EFO(2)(v) = EFO(v(2)) where v(2) = (v2, v2, v3, . . . , vn).
Theorem 5.2. With any n-agent matroid permutation environment, any n-tail-regular distribution
F , and any β-approximation mechanism to EFO(2), the expected revenue of the mechanism with
valuations v drawn i.i.d. from F is a 3β-approximation to the optimal mechanism for F .
Proof sketch. (The full proof in Appendix A.3.) We focus on showing the result for k-unit auc-
tions; the reduction in Section 6 will enable us to easily generalize this to matroid permutation
environments. We use tail regularity to get a bound on the payment from the highest agent in
terms of the Vickrey auction revenue, v2. Of course, EFO
(2)(v) is at least v2, and so the payment
from the highest agent is at most 2EFO(2)(v) (in expectation over i.i.d. draws of v from F ). The
second part of the argument involves bounding the total payments of agents {2, . . . , n}, point-wise
from above, by EFO(2)(v). This is possible by Lemma 4.3 and detailed analysis of k-unit auction
payments.
It is useful to compare the EFO benchmark to ones proposed in the literature that are based on
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism with the best (for the particular valuation profile v)
reserve price (e.g., Goldberg et al., 2006a; Hartline and Roughgarden, 2009). The VCG mechanism
with a reserve price first rejects all agents whose values to not meet the reserve, then it serves the
remaining agents to maximize the surplus (sum of values).
The VCG-with-reserve benchmark can be expressed as an ironed virtual surplus optimizer, and
so by Lemma 4.3, in matroid permutation environments, EFO is no smaller. For a digital good,
EFO and VCG-with-reserve are identical. For multi-unit auctions EFO is at most twice VCG-with-
reserve. For matroid permutation environments EFO can be (almost) a logarithmic factor larger
than VCG-with-reserve. Therefore, for general environments the EFO-based benchmark results in
stronger approximation guarantees.
Theorem 5.3. For any multi-unit environment and valuation profile v, EFO(v) ≤ 2VCG-with-reserve(v);
furthermore, for k units there exists a valuation profile v such that EFO(v) ≥ (2− 1
k
)VCG-with-reserve(v).
Proof. In the k-unit environment, the VCG-with-reserve benchmark on v is simply maxi≤k R(i).
The envy-free benchmark is EFO(v) = maxi≤k R¯(i). Recall that R¯ is concave. If R¯ attains its
maximum at r < k then R(r) = R¯(r) and both benchmarks obtain the same revenue and the first
part of the lemma holds; so assume that R¯ attains its maximum on {1, . . . , k} at k.
Suppose R is ironed on interval i < k < j. Then R¯(k) is the convex combination of R(i) and
R(j) as
R¯(k) = j−k
j−i R(i) +
k−i
j−i R(j) (1)
≤ R(i) + k
j
R(j) ≤ R(i) + R(k) ≤ 2VCG-with-reserve(v).
The second inequality follows because vk ≥ vj implies that kvk ≥
k
j
jvj ; the final equality follows
because both R(i) and R(k) are feasible revenues for VCG with reserve.
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The above bound is almost tight. Let v1 = k and v2 = v3 = · · · = vn = 1. The VCG-with-
reserve benchmark obtains revenue k whereas R¯(k) = n−k
n−1k +
k−1
n−1n, from equation (1), which
approaches 2k − 1 as n→∞.
Lemma 5.4. There exists a distribution F and n-agent matroid environment for which VCG with
any reserve price is an Ω(log n/ log log n)-approximation to the Bayesian optimal mechanism for
F .
Proof sketch. (A full proof is in Apprendix A.1) We construct a set system and an irregular dis-
tribution with a jagged revenue curve that has m = Ω( lognlog logn) deep “trenches”, such that the
following are true. (1) the Bayesian optimal mechanism for F gets about 1/m fraction of its rev-
enue from each trench via ironing. (2) VCG with reserve gets similar amount of good revenue from
at most one of the trenches by setting an appropriate reserve price, but only gets low revenue from
the other trenches due to the lack of ironing. In total, VCG with reserve only gets about 1/m
fraction of the Bayesian optimal revenue.
We conclude this section with a summary. For multi-unit environments we have given Bayesian
justification for the envy-free benchmark EFO(2). A mechanism that approximates this prior-free
benchmark simultaniously approximates the Bayesian optimal mechanisms for most i.i.d. ditri-
butions (i.e., those satisfying the relatively unrescrictive tail-regularity assumption). In the next
section we will give a reduction from matroid permutation and position environments to multi-unit
environments. This reduction implies that the envy-free benchmark is also Bayesian justified for
these environments. While we have not given formal justification for the envy-free benchmark in
downward-closed permutation environments (because of Lemma 4.4); we believe its approximation
is still of interest.
6 Multi-unit, Position, and Matroid Permutation Environments
In this section we consider matroid permutation, position auction, and multi-unit environments.
We show that for both incentive-compatible mechanism design and envy-free outcomes, these en-
vironments are closely related. In fact, for either IC or EF, respectively, the optimal mechanisms
across these environments are the same and approximation mechanisms give the same approxi-
mation factor. As an example, we will focus on approximating the envy-free benchmark EFO(2)
(Definition 5.2) with a prior-free mechanism. Our solution will be via a two-step reduction: we
reduce matroid permutation to position auction environments, which we then reduce to multi-unit
environments.
Recall that in a multi-unit environment it is feasible to serve any set of agents of cardinality
at most some given k. In position auction environments there are weights w1 ≥ w2 ≥ · · · ≥ wn
for positions and feasible outcomes are partial assignments of agents to positions. In matroid
permutation environments there is a feasibility constraint given by independent sets of a matroid,
but the roles of the agents are assigned by random permutation.
The property of these three environments that enables this reduction is that in each environment
the greedy algorithm on ironed virtual values (with ties broken randomly) obtains the maximum
ironed virtual surplus. The greedy algorithm works as follows: order the agents by ironed virtual
value and serve each agent in this order if her ironed virtual value is positive and if doing so is feasible
given the set of agents previously served. Notice that the only information needed to perform this
maximization is the ordering on the agents’ ironed virtual values (but not their magnitudes).
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Definition 6.1. The characteristic weights w1 ≥ w2 ≥ · · · ≥ wn of a matroid environment are
as follows: choose any valuation profile v with all distinct values, assign the agents to elements in
the matroid via a random permutation, run the greedy algorithm w.r.t. v, and define wi to be the
probability that ith largest valued agent is served.
6.1 Reduction for Ironed Virtual Surplus Maximizers
We first show ironed virtual surplus optimization in the three environments is equivalent.
Proposition 6.1. The ironed virtual surplus maximizing assignment (and its virtual surplus) is
equal in expectation in the following environments:
1. a matroid permutation environment with characteristic weights w,
2. a position auction environment with weights w,
3. a convex combination of multi-unit environments where k units are available with probability
wk − wk+1 for k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and wn+1 = 0.
Proof. Fix a tie-breaking rule, which induces an ordering on the agents. Consider the greedy
algorithm on the agents with non-negative Φ¯ values according to this ordering. The j-th agent
with non-negative Φ¯ value in this ordering (1) gets allocated with probability wj in the matroid
permutation setting by definition of characteristic weights, (2) gets assigned to position j in the
position auction and hence gets allocated with probability wj , and, (3) gets allocated in k-unit
auction for each k ≥ j, and hence has probability
∑
k≥j(wk − wk+1) = wj of being served in the
convex combination setting. Taking expectation over all tie-breaking orders, agent i has the same
probability of being served in the three settings.
The following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 6.2. For any valuation profile v and any weights w, the envy-free optimal revenue is
the same in each of the environments of Proposition 6.1.
A basic fact about incentive compatibility is that it is closed under convex combination, i.e.,
a randomization over two incentive compatible mechanisms is incentive compatible: truthtelling is
an optimal strategy in each, and so it remains an optimal strategy in the combination.
We now illustrate how to use Proposition 6.1 to show that an incentive compatible prior-free
approximation mechanisms for multi-unit environments can be adapted to give the same approxi-
mation factor in position auction and matroid permutation environments. Consider the following
incentive compatible mechanism.
Definition 6.2. The Random Sampling Empirical Myerson (RSEM) mechanism does the following:
(discussion of payments omitted)
1. randomly partition the population of agents N = {1, . . . , n} into two sets by flipping a fair
coin for each agent,
2. designate the set containing the highest-valued agent as the market M and the other set as
the sample S,
3. calculate the ironed virtual surplus function Φ¯S for the sample S, and,
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4. serve a feasible subset of M to maximize ironed virtual surplus with respect to Φ¯S and reject
all other agents.
Lemma 6.3. In any single-dimensional agent environment, RSEM is incentive compatible.
Proof. Notice that RSEM is monotone: An agent in S loses unless she raises her bid to beat the
highest-valued agent (in which case the roles of S and M are reversed). An agent in M wins
when the virtual surplus maximizing set contains the agent. If she raises her bid, she (weakly)
increases her virtual value thus increasing the virtual surplus of any set containing her, while the
virtual surplus of other sets remain the same. Therefore, she continues to win. By Theorem 4.1
monotonicity implies that, with the appropriate payments, RSEM is incentive compatible.
The proof of the following theorem is technical and we defer discussion of it to Section 6.3.
Theorem 6.4. In multi-unit environments, RSEM is a 12.5-approximation to the envy-free bench-
mark EFO(2)(v).
Notice that this mechanism can easily be generalized to other downward-closed environments.
It remains incentive compatible for these environments because it is essentially an ironed virtual
surplus optimizer on the setM , and furthermore, it is incentive compatible even if the permutation
that assigns agents to the set system is fixed. As a final corollary of Proposition 6.1, we can view
RSEM’s revenue in the matroid permutation or position auction environment as the analogous
convex combination of its revenue in multi-unit auction environments.
Corollary 6.5. In matroid permutation and position environments, RSEM is a prior-free 12.5-
approximation to the envy-free revenue EFO(2)(v).
6.2 General Reduction
The following prior-free approximations are essentially the best known for digital-good and multi-
unit environments. Notably, the mechanism from Corollary 6.8 below, is not based on ironed
virtual surplus maximization and therefore Proposition 6.1 cannot be applied to a construct matroid
permutation or position auction mechanism from it.
Lemma 6.6. (Ichiba and Iwama, 2010) In the digital good environment, there is a prior-free in-
centive compatible 3.12-approximation to EFO(2)(v).
We now give an approximate reduction from multi-unit auctions to digital good auctions. This
construction and the proof that the resulting mechanisms incentive compatibility are standard.
See, e.g., Myerson (1981), Goldberg et al. (2006a), and Aggarwal and Hartline (2006).
Definition 6.3 (Multi-unit Reduction). Given a k-agent digital good auction, we construct the
following k-unit auction:
1. Simulate the k-unit Vickrey auction.
2. Simulate the k-agent digital good auction on the k winners of the Vickrey auction.
3. Serve the agents who win in both stages and charge them the maximum of their simulation
payments; reject all other agents.
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Theorem 6.7. Given any digital-good auction that β-approximation to the envy-free benchmark
(resp. Bayesian optimal auction), the multi-unit auction from the reduction is a 2β-approximation
to the envy-free benchmark (resp. Bayesian optimal auction).
Proof. The digital good auction is a β-approximation to the envy-free benchmark on the top k
agents. The envy-free benchmark on the top k agents is equal to the VCG-with-reserve benchmark
for the full set of agents (both are equal to maxi≤k R(i)). Theorem 5.3 states that the VCG-with-
reserve benchmark is a 2-approximation to the envy-free benchmark. Therefore, the multi-unit
auction from the reduction is a 2β-approximation to the envy-free benchmark.
Corollary 6.8. In multi-unit environments, there is an incentive compatible prior-free 6.24-approximation
to EFO(2)(v).
We now show how to construct, from any multi-unit auction, a position auction and matroid
permutation mechanism that has the exact same outcome (in expectation) as a convex combination
of multi-unit auctions (as in Proposition 6.1). The challenge here is the distinct interfaces to the
environment: in multi-unit auctions we are given a supply constraint k and we need to specify a
set of at most k winners, whereas in position auctions, we are given weights and need to output a
partial assignment of agents to positions.
Definition 6.4 (Position Auction Reduction). Given k-unit auction mechanisms for k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
we construct the following mechanism for the position auction environment with weights w:
1. Introduce n dummy agents and n dummy positions into the system, indexed by {n+1, . . . , 2n}.
Correspondingly, we pad weights w and valuation profile v with zeros such that they have
dimension 2n.
2. For each k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, simulate the k-unit auction on valuation profile v, and give the
unallocated leftover units to the dummy agents arbitrarily for free. Let the resulting allocation
of all 2n agents be x(k).
3. Calculate the probability that each agent is served in the convex combination: xi =
∑n
k=1 x
(k)
i (wk−
wk+1), for i ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}.
4. Solve for a set of permutation matrices Pt ∈ {0, 1}
2n×2n and nonnegative weights rt with∑
t rt = 1 such that
∑
t rt · Pt ·w = x.
5. With probability rt, assign agents to positions according to the permutation specified by Pt.
6. Discard dummy agents and dummy position assignments.
To justify step 4, one can verify that w majorizes x in the sense that
∑k
i=1 wi ≥
∑k
i=1 xi for
k ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}, with equality holding for k = 2n. Therefore by a theorem of Rado (1952), the
desired permutation matrices and weights exist. The following consequences are immediate.
Lemma 6.9. The resulting mechanism for position auction with weights w obtained from the above
reduction has the same allocation as the convex combination of k-unit auctions with (wk −wk+1)’s
as probabilities.
Lemma 6.10. Given an incentive compatible multi-unit auction, the mechanism from the position
auction reduction is also incentive compatible.
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Definition 6.5 (Matroid Permutation Reduction). Given a position auction mechanism for weights
w, we construct the following mechanism for matroid permutation environment with characteristic
weights w:
1. We run the position auction and for i = 1, . . . , n, let ji be the position assigned to agent i, or
ji = ⊥ if i is not assigned a position.
2. Reject all agents i with ji = ⊥.
3. Run the greedy algorithm in the matroid permutation environment with agent i’s value reset
to ji.
The following conclusions are immediate.
Lemma 6.11. The resulting mechanism for matroid permutation environment obtained from the
above reduction has the same allocation as the position auction.
Lemma 6.12. Given an incentive-compatible position auction, the mechanism from the matroid
permutation reduction is incentive compatible (in matroid permutation environments).
Theorem 6.13. The factor β to which there is a prior-free incentive-compatible approximation of
EFO(2)(v) is the same for multi-unit, position, and matroid permutation environments.
Corollary 6.14. There is a prior-free incentive-compatible 6.24-approximation to EFO(2)(v) in
matroid permutation and position environments.
There are two weakness in the reductions implied by Theorem 6.13 in comparison to those
implied by Proposition 6.1. Recall that for the latter, ironed virtual surplus maximizations are via
the greedy algorithm, and so the reductions were algorithmically trivial. In contrast, Theorem 6.13
requires knowledge of the characteristic weights to run the construction, these weights may be hard
to compute. In addition the mechanism that results from the matroid permutation reduction is only
incentive compatible if the agents are assigned to roles in the matroid via a random permutation
as suggested in the model. In contrast, RSEM in matroid environments is incentive compatible
without any random permutation (Lemma 6.3).
6.3 Multi-unit Analysis of RSEM
In this section we prove Theorem 6.4 which shows that in multi-unit environments RSEM (Defini-
tion 6.2) is a 12.5-approximation to the envy-free benchmark. We further assume that the number
of units available is k ≥ 2. This is without loss of generality because with k = 1 RSEM produces
the same outcome as the Vickrey auction which is optimal with respect to the envy-free benchmark
EFO(2)(v) = v2.
The approximation factor is the product of three terms: 2 × 43 × 4.68 ≈ 12.5. Roughly, these
three terms come from the following steps:
1. We bound the performance relative to the VCG-with-reserve benchmark (i.e., maxi≤k R(i)).
By Theorem 5.3 this benchmark can be at most a factor of two below the envy-free benchmark.
2. We use an intermediary envy-free-like revenue which is (usually) at most 43 of RSEM’s
incentive-compatible revenue.
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3. Finally we employ a result due to Alaei et al. (2009) to show that the expected relative
imbalance between the sample and the market is 4.68; in particular our intermediary envy-
free-like revenue is a 4.68 fraction of the VCG-with-reserve benchmark in expectation.
To lay out the quantities we will be discussing, recall that RSEM partitions the agents into a
sample S and marketM where the highest valued agent, 1, is conditioned to be inM . The (ironed)
virtual surplus for Φ¯S onM is then optimized by selling the k units to the agents with the k highest
(positive) virtual values. Conditioned on the partitioning, let p and q denote the supremum and
infimum values that correspond to the virtual value of the k+1st highest agent in M . Notice that
if an agent in M bids above p she always wins, if she bids below q she always loses, and if she bids
on (q, p) she wins with some probability. Let i and j be the number of agents in the market that
are above p and q, respectively, and observe that i ≤ k < j. This sort of outcome was termed by
Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) as a p-q-lottery.
Notice that if we had enough units it would be envy free (for M) to sell to the top j agents
at price q for revenue L(j) = qj or to sell to the top i agents at price p for revenue L(i) = pi.
Envy-free revenue is linear and therefore with only k items we can linearly interpolate between
these two revenues to obtain revenue (cf. Section 5, equation (1)):
L(k) = j−k
j−iL(i) +
k−i
j−iL(j).
This is the envy-free intermediary we referred to in Step 2, above.2
The IC revenue of this p-q-lottery, and consequently of RSEM, is lower than the envy-free
revenue given by L(k). The top i agents each receive a unit and pay p − (p − q) (k−i+1)
j−i+1 (by
Theorem 4.1). The next j − i agents each receive a unit with probability k−i
j−i and pay q. The
revenue of RSEM for selling k units to M is thus,
RSEM(k) = (k − i)q + i
(
p− (p− q) (k−i+1)
j−i+1
)
.
This is also a linear function of k and, while we require by assumption that i ≤ k < j, formulaically
RSEM(j) = L(j).
We now derive a linear function that upper bounds R¯
S
(k), the ironed revenue curve for the
sample. This upper bound will be parameterized by the degree of imbalance between the sample
and market.
Definition 6.6. The imbalance λ of a partitioning (S,M) of agents N = {1, . . . , n} is λ =
maxi∈N
Yi
i−Yi
where Yi = |{1, 2, . . . , i} ∩ S| is the number of the highest i agents in S.
For a given imbalance λ the number of agents in S with value at least p (resp. q) is at most
iλ (resp. jλ). Define H(j) = qjλ, H(i) = min(piλ,H(j)), and H(k) as the linear interpolation
between points (i,H(i)) and (j,H(j)). The reason we take the minimum in the second step is that
since R¯
S
(k) is monotone, an upper bound on R¯
S
(j) is an upper bound for all k ∈ [i, j]. For this
definition, H(k) ≥ R¯
S
(k); we defer proof of this lemma for later.
Lemma 6.15. For H(k) defined above, H(k) is at least the envy-free revenue of the sample, R¯
S
(k).
2This envy-free revenue is not the revenue-maximal one specified by the payment identity of Lemma 3.1.
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Now we have three linear functions defined on [i, j]: H(·), the upper bound on the envy-
free revenue from the sample; L(·), the envy-free intermediary for the market; and RSEM(·), the
incentive compatible revenue of RSEM on the market. Simply, when L(·) is increasing (so H(·) is
parallel to it), the maximal ratio between RSEM and H occurs at k = i. The following lemma
shows that this ratio is 43λ which follows from the ratio of RSEM(i) to L(i) being
4
3 ; the proof is
deferred to later.
Lemma 6.16. With imbalance λ and increasing L(·), the ratio of RSEM to H is at most 43λ.
When L(·) is decreasing then H(·) is constant and the ratio between RSEM and H is maximized
at k ∈ {i, j}. Because the ratio of H(j) to L(j) = RSEM(j) is λ by definition; we must only show
that the RSEM(i) ≥ 34L(j). We do this in the following lemma, proof of which is deferred to later.
Lemma 6.17. With imbalance λ and decreasing L(·), the ratio of RSEM to H is at most 43λ.
We conclude by decomposing Step 3 into two parts. The first is the ratio between the VCG-
with-reserve benchmark on all agents N and the envy-free benchmark on the sample S. The second
is the ratio between our upper bound H(·) on the envy-free revenue of the sample S to the revenue
of RSEM(·). The latter is, by Lemmas 6.16 and 6.17, at most 43λ. To calculate the former, the
VCG-with-reserve benchmark sells to r ≤ k agents at price vr for a total revenue of R(r) = rvr.
Of course, on the sample S it is envy-free to post price vr as well; such a price is accepted by Yr
(from the definition of imbalance, Definition 6.6) agents for a total revenue of vrYr. The optimal
envy-free revenue for the sample is no smaller. We conclude:
Lemma 6.18. The envy-free revenue of the sample satisfies R¯
S
(k) ≥ Yr
r
·VCG-with-reserve(k).
Combining the ratios from these two parts, r
Yr
and 43λ we conclude that our revenue is governed
by the expectation of random variable X = r
Yr
λ. Its expectation is bounded by the following
lemma:
Lemma 6.19. (Alaei et al., 2009) For all positive integers r, random variable X = r
Yr
λ, for Yi
and imbalance λ as defined in Definition 6.6 satisfies:
E[1/X ] ≥ 1/4.68.
Lemmas 6.15–6.19 and Theorem 5.3 combine to prove Theorem 6.4. We conclude with the
proofs of the three deferred lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 6.15. Assume H(k) is increasing. We show that H(k) is at least the envy-free
revenue of the sample, R¯
S
(k). R¯
S
is ironed between values p and q; therefore, it has a line segment
that connects two points on the lines from the origin with slope p and q. These respective points
are closer to the origin than (iλ, piλ) and (jλ, qjλ), by the definition of the imbalance parameter λ.
Therefore, these latter points are strictly above the revenue curve R¯
S
(·) and furthermore so is the
line segment that connects them. Since the revenue curve is monotone we can shift these points to
the left and they (and the line segment between them) remain above the revenue curve. The line
H(·) is constructed in this manner. If, on the other hand, H(k) not increasing (then by definition
it is constant) then all we need is the end point (j,H(j)) to be above the ironed revenue curve for
S which is implicit in the argument above.
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Proof of Lemma 6.16. We show that if L(·) is increasing then RSEM(i) ≥ 34L(i). We assume that
i ≥ 2 (otherwise, a similar analysis for i = 1 and k = 2 can be employed). To do this we give an
upper bound on
L(i)−RSEM(i)
L(i) =
p−q
p(j−i+1) ≤
1
6 .
The lemma follows easily from this upper bound. (In fact this gives a bound of 56 ; the ratio
3
4 is
tight for a different case.) Consider maximizing the above quantity subject to the constraints
• 2 ≤ i < j. (i and j are integers.)
• p > q > 0.
• pi ≤ qj.
Rewriting the last of these as q/p ≥ i/j, we get that(
1− q
p
)
1
j−i+1 ≤
(
1− i
j
)
1
j−i+1 =
j−i
j(j−i+1) .
For any fixed j, the above quantity is maximized at the smallest i, which is 2. So we need to
maximize
j−2
j(j−1) .
over all integers j ≥ 3. It is easy to see that it is maximized at j = 3 with value 1/6.
Proof of Lemma 6.17. When L(·) is decreasing we show that RSEM(i) ≥ 34L(j). Suppose that
actually L(i) > (j + 1)q. (This is slightly stronger than the hypothesis in the lemma, since L(j) =
jq.) RSEM as a function of k is linear and has a negative slope, so it decreases in the interval [i, j). If
the linear function were to be extended to j, then it would be exactly L(j). Thus RSEM(i) ≥ L(j).
(There is no loss of a factor.)
The other case is where L(j) < L(i) < (j + 1)q. In this case one can compare RSEM(i) with
L(j) and show that they are within a factor of (j + 1)/j which is at most 4/3, since j ≥ 3.
7 Downward-closed Permutation Environments
In this section, we will show that a variant of RSEM (recall Definition 6.2) approximates the
envy-free benchmark by a constant factor.
Definition 7.1 (RSEM′). The variant RSEM′ is identical to RSEM except Step 4:
4′. find the feasible subset W of N (the full set of agents) to maximize ironed virtual surplus with
respect to Φ¯S, serve agents in M ∩W (the winners from the market M) only, and reject all
other agents.
The proof we give that RSEM′ is a good approximation to the envy-free benchmark is based
on the fact that with large probability the sample and market satisfy a natural balanced condition.
This condition requires that, for all prefixes of the agents sorted by value, a good fraction of these
agents are in each of the market and sample. The proof then has three main steps: show the
probability of balance is high, show balance implies that the IC revenue of RSEM′ (on the market
M) is close to the optimal EF revenue for the sample S, and show the expected optimal EF revenue
of the sample is close to the envy-free benchmark.
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Theorem 7.1. For downward-closed permutation environments, E
[
ICRSEM
′
(v)
]
≥ 1189 EFO
(2)(v)
for all v.
Proof. Let B denote the event that the market and sample are balanced. Lemma 7.2 states that
the probability that the partition is balanced is at least:
Pr[B] ≥ 0.339.
The expected IC revenue of RSEM′ is at least its revenue conditioned on the partitioning into
sample and market being balanced (denoted as event B). I.e.,
E
[
ICRSEM
′
(v)
]
≥ Pr[B]E
[
ICRSEM
′
(v) | B
]
.
Lemma 7.3 states that for any v that balance implies the IC revenue of RSEM′ is at least a 132
fraction of the EF optimal revenue on the sample. Taking expectations,
E
[
ICRSEM
′
(v) | B
]
≥ 132E[EFO(vS) | B] .
Lemma 7.11 states that the EF optimal revenue on the sample is at least half the envy-free bench-
mark, in expectation and conditioned on a balanced partitioning. I.e.,
E[EFO(vS) | B] ≥
1
2 EFO
(2)(v).
Combining the above inequalities we conclude that the IC revenue of RSEM′ is a least a 189-
approximation to the envy-free benchmark. I.e.,
E
[
ICRSEM
′
(v)
]
≥ 1189 EFO
(2)(v).
7.1 Balanced Partitioning
We now show that with high probability the partitioning of the agents into the market and sample
satisfies a natural balanced property. Recall that, by definition, agent 1 is in M . This balanced
property is a double-sided version of the balanced property introduced by Feige et al. (2005).
Definition 7.2. A partitioning (S,M) of agents N = {1, . . . , n} is balanced if 1 ∈ M and 2 ∈ S
and for any set of three or more of the highest valued agents both the market and sample contain at
least a quarter of agents in the set. I.e., for i ≥ 3, |S ∩ {1, . . . , i}| ≥ i/4 and |M ∩ {1, . . . , i}| ≥ i/4.
Lemma 7.2. Conditioning on 1 ∈ M , a random partitioning (S,M) of N is balanced with proba-
bility at least 0.339.
Proof. Conditioning on 1 ∈ M and 2 ∈ S, the probability that either part is imbalanced can be
calculated to be at most 0.161 by a simple probability of ruin analysis which comes from Feige et al.
(2005) (details given below). By the union bound, both parts are balanced with probability at least
0.678. Agent 2 is in S with probability 1/2 so the probability of balance conditioned on agent 1 in
M is at least 0.339.
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The following analysis from Feige et al. (2005) shows that the probability that S is imbalanced
is at most 0.161. Consider the random variable Zi = 4 |S ∩ {1, . . . , i}| − i; the balanced condition
is equivalent to Zi ≥ 0 for all i ≥ 3. By the conditioning i = 2 and S ∩ {1, 2} = {2} imply that
Z2 = 2. View Zi as the positions of a random walk on the integers that starts from position two and
takes three steps forward (at step i with i ∈ S) or one step back (at step i with i 6∈ S), each with
probability one half. If this random walk ever arrives at position −1 the partitioning is imbalanced.
This probability r of ever taking one step back in such a random walk can be calculated as the
root of r4 − 2r + 1 on interval (0, 1) which is about 0.544. The probability of imbalance is then
r3 ≤ 0.161 (i.e., if we ever take three steps back when starting from position two). By symmetry,
the probability of imbalance in the market M is also at most 0.161.
7.2 Market revenue versus sample revenue
We now show that conditioned on a balanced partitioning of the agents into a market and sample,
that the revenue of RSEM′ from the market is close to the envy-free optimal revenue from the
sample. The revenue of RSEM′ is precisely ICSM (vN ), i.e., the revenue we get from the agents in
M when using the virtual value functions from S and optimizing virtual values on the over the full
set of agents N . We wish to compare this revenue to the envy-free optimal revenue on the sample,
EFO(vS). Our bound follows from three steps: the IC revenue of RSEM
′ fromM is close to its EF
revenue from M , the EF revenue of RSEM′ from M is close to its EF revenue from the full set of
agents N , and this EF revenue from the full set of agents is close to the optimal envy-free revenue
from the sample.
Lemma 7.3. Given a balanced partitioning (M,S), ICRSEM
′
(v) ≥ 132 EFO(vS).
Proof. The proof is given by the following sequence of inequalities:
ICRSEM
′
(v) = ICSM (vN ) (Definition 7.1)
≥ 12 EF
S
M (vN ) (Lemma 4.2)
≥ 18 EF
S
N (vN ) (below, Lemma 7.4)
≥ 132 EF
S
S(vS) (below, Lemma 7.9)
= 132 EFO(vS).
The first step (Lemma 4.2) of Lemma 7.3 was proven in Section 4. To see the second step notice
that the envy-free payment of the agents i ∈ N in EFS(vN ) form a non-increasing sequence. This
non-increasing sequence of payments can be plugged into the following lemma (Lemma 7.4) as the
ais. The proof of the lemma follows directly from its statement.
Lemma 7.4. Given a balanced partitioning (S,M), for every non-increasing sequence a1, . . . , an
of nonnegative reals and all i ∈ N ,
∑
j∈M∩{1,...,i} aj ≥
1
4
∑
j∈{1,...,i} aj .
To show the third step, we need to give a detailed analysis of what happens in terms of envy-free
revenue when we optimize for the wrong virtual values. To do that we will define and consider
the effective revenue curve, R˜, and perceived revenue curve, R̂. Intuitively, R̂ corresponds to the
revenue we think we get when optimizing Φ¯S on v, and R˜ corresponds to the revenue curve we
actually end up with.
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(a) Effective Ironing (b) Revenue dominance
Figure 4: Effective revenue curves and revenue dominance depicted.
Definition 7.3 (Effective revenue curve R˜). For values v and ironed virtual valuations Φ¯S for S:
group agents with equal nonnegative Φ¯S values into consecutive classes {1, . . . , n1}, {n1+1, . . . , n2},
. . . , {nt−1 + 1, . . . , nt} and define the effective revenue curve R˜ from R = R
v by connecting the
points (0, 0), (n1,R(n1)), . . . , (nt,R(nt)) and then extending horizontally to (n,R(nt)), i.e., ironing
the values in each class.
Figure 4(a) depicts an example of the effective revenue curve. The three rays from the origin,
which correspond to values at which Φ¯S makes a piece-wise jump, divide the first orthant into four
regions. For every region, every point (i,R(i)) in the region (which corresponds to value vi) has
the same Φ¯S value. In each region these points get “ironed”, and hence the line segment in R˜.
Lemma 7.5. EFΦ¯
S
(v) =
∑n
i=1 R˜(i) · (x
S
i (v) − x
S
i+1(v)).
Proof.
EFΦ¯
S
(v) =
∑n
i=1
R(i) · (xSi (v)− x
S
i+1(v))
=
∑n
i=1
R˜(i) · (xSi (v)− x
S
i+1(v))
Here the first equality is by Lemma 3.5. To justify the second equality, note that whenever R˜(i) 6=
R(i), there are two cases: (1) i is in {nj−1 + 1, . . . , nj − 1} for some j, and so vi and vi+1 have the
same Φ¯S value, and hence xSi (v) = x
S
i+1(v); and (2) i is bigger than nt, and so vi and vi+1 both
have negative Φ¯S value, and hence xSi (v) = x
S
i+1(v) = 0.
For a set of agents S, let vS denote (vS ,0N−S), i.e., the valuation profile (of n agents) obtained
from v by decreasing the values of agents outside S to 0. Note that v = vN . Let R
S and R¯
S
be
the revenue curve and ironed revenue curve of the valuation profile vS respectively.
Lemma 7.6. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, R˜(i) ≥ R¯
S
(i).
Proof sketch. Figure 4(b) depicts the relationship between the revenue curves. Observe that revenue
curve R dominates RS in the sense that for every slope t, the intersection of the ray y = tx with
R is farther away from the origin than its intersection with RS . Transforming R and RS to the
effective revenue curves using the same ironed virtual valuation function Φ¯S do not change such
dominance relationship, and moreover, because R¯
S
is non-decreasing and concave, it follows that
vertical dominance also holds, i.e., R˜(i) ≥ R¯
S
(i) for all i.
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Definition 7.4 (Perceived revenue curve R̂). The perceived revenue curve for Φ¯S on v is given by
R̂(i) =
∑i
j=1 Φ¯
S(vi) for i ∈ N .
Let vˆ be the valuation profile corresponding to R̂, i.e., vˆi = R̂(i)/i, and let x
vˆ be the ironed
virtual surplus maximizer for Φ¯vˆ.
Lemma 7.7. xSi (v) = x
vˆ
i (vˆ).
Proof. Compare running the ironed virtual surplus maximizer xS for Φ¯S on v with running xvˆ for
Φ¯vˆ on vˆ, the ironed virtual valuation of agent i in either case is equal to Φ¯S(vi). Therefore these
two ironed virtual surplus optimizers will choose the same allocation, and the lemma follows.
Lemma 7.8. Given a balanced partitioning (S,M), then R¯
S
(i) ≥ 14R̂(i) ≥
1
4R¯
S
(i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. For each i, R̂(i) is the sum of i largest ironed virtual values in N with respect to Φ¯S while
R¯
S
(i) is the sum of the i largest with respect to S. Therefore R̂ ≥ R¯
S
(i). Since (S,M) is double-side
balanced, applying Lemma 7.4, we also have that for all i, R¯
S
(i) ≥ 14 R̂(i).
Now we are ready prove the following key lemma:
Lemma 7.9. For any downward-closed permutation environments, any valuation profile v, and
balanced partitioning (S,M), EFΦ¯
S
(vN ) ≥
1
4 EF
Φ¯S(vS) =
1
4 EFO(vS).
Proof. Let xS and xvˆ be short-hands for the ironed virtual surplus optimizers with ironed virtual
valuation functions defined for vS and vˆ, respectively. The proof is by the following inequalities:
EFΦ¯
S
(vN ) =
∑
i
R˜(i) · (xSi (vN )− x
S
i+1(vN ))
=
∑
i
R˜(i) · (xvˆi (vˆ)− x
vˆ
i+1(vˆ))
≥ 14 ·
∑
i
R̂(i) · (xvˆi (vˆ)− x
vˆ
i+1(vˆ))
≥ 14 ·
∑
i
R̂(i) · (xSi (vS)− x
S
i+1(vS))
≥ 14 ·
∑
i
R¯
S
(i) · (xSi (vS)− x
S
i+1(vS)).
Here the first two equalities are guaranteed by our definitions of R˜ and R̂. The first inequality is
by Lemma 7.6 and Lemma 7.8, the second inequality is by the optimality of xvˆ for vˆ, and the third
inequality is by Lemma 7.8 again.
7.3 Expected sample revenue versus the envy-free benchmark
We now show that the expected envy-free revenue of the sample compares favorably with the envy-
free benchmark; this is the last ingredient in the proof of Theorem 7.1. We will make this argument
conditioned on a balanced partitioning; however, the result is true for any symmetric conditioning
(including none at all).
Lemma 7.10. For a partitioning (S,M) of N , we have that EFO(vS) + EFO(vM ) ≥ EFO(vN ).
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Proof. EFO(vN ) = EFO(vS∪M ) is the maximum revenue we can get from S ∪M subject to the
envy free constraints. Let agents in M contribute total revenue R to EFO(vN ). By setting the
agents in S to have zero valuations to obtain valuation profile vS , we basically removed envy-
freedom constraints between agents in S and agents in M . With fewer envy-freedom constraints,
the maximum envy-free revenue we can get from M , i.e., EFO(vM ), can only be larger. Similarly,
the total revenue that S contributes to EFO(vN ) is at most EFO(vS), and our lemma follows.
Lemma 7.11. E[EFO(vS) | B] ≥
1
2 EFO
(2)(v) where B is the event that S and M are balanced.
Proof. The lemma follows from Lemma 7.10, symmetry, and the fact that agent 1 is always in
M .
References
Aggarwal, G. and Hartline, J. (2006). Knapsack auctions. In Proceedings of the 17th Annual
ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms.
Alaei, S., Malekian, A., and Srinivasan, A. (2009). On random sampling auctions for digital goods.
In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 187–196.
Balcan, M.-F., Blum, A., Hartline, J. D., and Mansour, Y. (2008). Reducing mechanism design to
algorithm design via machine learning. J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 74(8):1245–1270.
Baliga, S. and Vohra, R. (2003). Market research and market design. Advances in Theoretical
Economics, 3.
Bikhchandani, S., de Vries, S., Schummer, J., and Vohra, R. (2008). Ascending auctions for
integral (poly)matroids with concave nondecreasing separable values. In Proc. 19th ACM Symp.
on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pages 864–873.
Bulow, J. and Klemperer, P. (1996). Auctions versus negotiations. American Economic Review,
86(1):180–194.
Bulow, J. and Roberts, J. (1989). The simple economics of optimal auctions. The Journal of
Political Economy, 97:1060–90.
Clarke, E. H. (1971). Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 11:17–33.
Dughmi, S., Roughgarden, T., and Sundararajan, M. (2009). Revenue submodularity. In EC ’09:
Proceedings of the tenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 243–252.
Edelman, B., Ostrovsky, M., and Schwarz, M. (2007). Internet advertising and the generalized
second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. The American Economic
Review, 97(1):242–259.
Feige, U., Flaxman, A., Hartline, J., and Kleinberg, R. (2005). On the Competitive Ratio of the
Random Sampling Auction. In Proc. 1st Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, pages
878–886.
26
Goldberg, A., Hartline, J., Karlin, A., Saks, M., and Wright, A. (2006a). Competitive auctions.
Games and Economic Behavior.
Goldberg, A., Hartline, J., Karlin, A., Saks, M., and Wright, A. (2006b). Competitive auctions.
Games and Economic Behavior, 55(2):242–269.
Goldberg, A. V. and Hartline, J. D. (2003). Competitiveness via consensus. In Proc. 14th ACM
Symp. on Discrete Algorithms (SODA). ACM/SIAM.
Goldberg, A. V., Hartline, J. D., and Wright, A. (2001). Competitive auctions and digital goods.
In Proc. 12th ACM Symp. on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pages 735–744.
Groves, T. (1973). Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41:617–631.
Ha, B. and Hartline, J. (2011). Biased random sampling and profit extraction. Manuscript.
Ha, B. and Hartline, J. (2012). Mechanism design via profit extraction, consensus, and cross-check.
In Proc. 23st ACM Symp. on Discrete Algorithms (SODA).
Hartline, J. (2011). Approximation in mechanism design. Manuscript.
Hartline, J. and McGrew, R. (2005). From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions. In Proc.
7th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC), pages 175–182.
Hartline, J. and Roughgarden, T. (2008). Optimal mechanism design and money burning. In Proc.
39th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 75–84.
Hartline, J. and Roughgarden, T. (2009). Simple versus optimal mechanisms. In Proc. 11th ACM
Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC).
Ichiba, T. and Iwama, K. (2010). Averaging techniques for competitive auctions. In Proceedings of
the Seventh Workshop on Analytic Algorithmics and Combinatorics, pages 74–81.
Jackson, M. and Kremer, I. (2007). Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies. Review
of Economic Design, 11:185–198.
Lehmann, D. J., O’Callaghan, L., and Shoham, Y. (2002). Truth revelation in approximately
efficient combinatorial auctions. J. ACM, 49(5):577–602.
Myerson, R. (1981). Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1):58–73.
Oxley, J. G. (1992). Matroid Theory. Oxford Science Publications. The Clarendon Press, Oxford
University Press, New York.
Rado, R. (1952). An equality. J. London Math. Soc., 27:1–6.
Segal, I. (2003). Optimal pricing mechanisms with unknown demand. In American Economic
Review 93.
Talwar, K. (2003). The price of truth: Frugality in truthful mechanisms. In Proc. 20th Annual
Symp. on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), pages 608–619.
27
Varian, H. (2007). Position auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 25(6):1163–
1178.
Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J. of Finance,
16:8–37.
Wilson, R. (1987). Game theoretic analysis of trading processes. Advances in Economic Theory.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 5.4
Fix some number m.
The matroid we use is a partition matroid. In general in a partition matroid, the ground set is
partitioned into a number of disjoint sets, or sectors, where each sector is associated with a capacity
number. A set is feasible if and only if its intersection with each sector does not exceed the capacity
number of the sector.
Now we define the partition matroid we use. For each k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, a type k sector contains
m3k−1 elements or agents and has capacity one. There are m2m−2k disjoint type k sectors for each
k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. So total number of agents n is at most mO(m). Hence m is at least of order lognlog logn .
Next we define the “sydney opera house distribution”. The distribution F is such that the value
is distributed according to uniform distribution [m2k+1− ǫ,m2k+1+ ǫ] with probability 1
m3k
− 1
m3k+3
for k ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}, and with probability 1
m3k
for k = m. Here we take ǫ to be some sufficiently
negligible positive amount, and we will often omit ǫ related terms. So for each k the revenue function
R at 1
m3k+3
has left limit R( 1
m3k+3
−) = m
2k+3
m3k+3
= 1
mk
, and right limit R( 1
m3k+3
+) = m
2k+1
m3k+3
= 1
mk+2
.
Hence the ironed virtual valuation between quantile 1
m3k+3
to quantile 1
m3k
is
1
mk−1
− 1
mk
1
m3k
− 1
m3k+3
≈ m2k+1.
Note that the ironed virtual valuation is equal to valuation, ignoring minor terms.
To calculate the revenue of Myerson’s auction, for a type k sector, there arem3k−1 agents. With
probability at least 1 − (1 − 1
m3k
)m
3k−1
≈ 1
m
, the highest agent is in quantile range (0, 1
m3k
), with
ironed virtual valuation at least m2k+1. So the expected ironed virtual valuation from a type k
sector is at least m2k. Multiplied by the number of type k sectors the total ironed virtual valuation,
and hence expected revenue is at least
∑
km
2k ·m2m−2k = m ·m2m.
To calculate the revenue of V CG with some reserve r, suppose w.l.o.g. r ≈ m2k
′+1 for some
k′. For a type k sector with m3k−1 agents, the dominant amount of revenue is obtained from the
following two cases:
1. When there are at least two agents with value at least m2k+1 − ǫ (i.e. in quantile 1
m3k
), the
lower of which has value at most m2k+1 + ǫ. This happens with probability roughly 1
m2
, and
gives revenue m2k+1. Therefore the expected revenue we get from this case is 1
m2
· m2k+1,
which multiplied by the number of type k sector, is O(m2m−1).
2. When k = k′, and there is at least one agent who beats the reserve m2k+1. This happens with
probability at most 1
m
. Therefore the expected revenue from this case is m2k+1 · 1
m
, which
multiplied by the number of type k sectors is O(m2m).
28
Summing over all k, the total expected revenue of V CG with reserve r is at most O(m2m) +
m · O(m2m−1) = O(m2m), which is less than that of Myerson’s auction by a factor of Ω(m) =
Ω(log n/ log log n).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4.4
Let there be n + 1 agents. The “1 vs n” set system has two maximum feasible sets, one is a
singleton set and the other one has size n. These two sets are disjoint. We define the valuation
profile by specifying the virtual valuations. There are n “small” agents with virtual values v+ǫ, v+
2ǫ, . . . , v+nǫ respectively, and one “big” agent with virtual value nv+ n(n+1)2 ǫ− ǫ
2 for some small
positive ǫ. The choice of the ǫ terms is such that for the sum of the virtual valuations of the first
n agents to beat the big agent, no small agent can lower her virtual value to some other agent’s
virtual value. We will ignore ǫ terms from now on. Correspondingly, one can calculate the revenue
curve, and then derive the valuations of the agents: the valuation of the big agent is nv, and the
small agents have values n+12 v,
n+2
3 v,. . . ,
2n
n+1v, ignoring ǫ terms. The allocation rule is the ironed
virtual surplus optimizer w.r.t. this valuation profile. Note that a reserve of 2n
n+1v is set because
any value lower than this corresponds to a negative ironed virtual value.
Observe that every agent wins if and only if she is assigned to the size n set, which happens
with probability n/(n+1). Therefore the EF revenue is 2n
n+1v ·
n
n+1 ·(n+1) =
2n2
n+1v. To calculate the
IC revenue, with probability n/(n+1), the big agent is assigned to the size n set, and every of the
n winning agents pays the reserve 2n
n+1v. Also with probability 1/(n+ 1), the big agent is assigned
to the singleton set, and every agent has to pay her own value, which sums up to Θ(nv log(n)).
Therefore the IC revenue is 2n
n+1v ·
n
n+1 · n+
1
n+1Θ(nv log(n)), which is larger than EF revenue for
sufficiently large n.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 5.2
Proof. By the reduction from matroid permutation environments to multi-unit environments, it is
sufficient to prove the statement for k-unit auctions. Let Φ¯ be the ironed virtual surplus maximizer
for F . We first upper-bound IC revenue from bidders 2 to n:
ICF2...n(v) ≤ EF
Φ¯
2...n(v)
≤ EFO(v2, v3, . . . , vn, 0)
≤ EFO(v(2))
= EFO(2)(v)
Here the first inequality is by Lemma 4.3, and the last equality is by definition of EFO(2).
To see the second inequality, both left hand side and right hand side correspond to the maximum
envy-free revenue from 2 . . . n that correspond to some outcome with at most k items allocated and
no envy among 2 . . . n, except that in the right hand side, the outcome that maximizes this revenue
is chosen.
To see the third inequality, note that the revenue curve of v(2) dominates that of (v2, v3, . . . , vn, 0),
and hence by Lemma 3.2, for every allocation, the envy-free revenue for v(2) can only be higher.
Next we upper-bound IC revenue from bidder 1, where the expectation is over i.i.d. draws from
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distribution F .
E[ICΦ¯1 (v)] ≤ E[IC
Φ¯(v) for single item auction]
≤ 2E[v2]
≤ 2E[EFO(2)(v)]
Here the second inequality is by the tail regularity assumption. The third inequality is because
EFO(2)(v) ≥ v2.
To see the first inequality, consider the mechanism that first runs Φ¯, and then only allows the
highest bidder (bidder 1) to win. The IC payment of bidder 1 is the maximum of the second highest
bid and the threshold bid for bidder 1 to win in Φ¯. This is as much as the threshold (or revenue)
from bidder 1 in Φ¯ as in the left hand side. On the other hand, the IC revenue of this mechanism
is at most that of the optimal single-item auction, which equals to the right hand side.
Together, we have that E[ICΦ¯(v)] ≤ 3E[EFO(2)(v)].
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